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Briggs: Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement

Need for Adoption of the 1958 Amendment to
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act
By EDWIN W. BRIGGS*
In 1950 the National Conference on Uniform State Laws approved an
Act entitled "The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," drafted to
subject to effective court action, all persons alleged to owe duties of support
to other persons resident in a foreign jurisdiction. It was aimed particularly at fleeing parents who seek to evade their support obligations by escaping
to another state, and very quickly demonstrated its value in proving to be
generally effective in coping with this hitherto "intractible problem."
Montana adopted this Act in 1951, though at the time the original Act continued to be under study for possible improvement. Such study resulted
in a major revision thereof in 1952. This writer sought to analyze both the
original and the revised Acts in an article published in the spring of 1954,1
in which it was urged that Montana enact the revised form of the law at
once.
In 1956 in its annual meeting the Montana Bar Association passed a
resolution, also urging adoption of the revised Act. Then, in August of
1958, the National Conference approved still another revision. While
the improvements in the law, found in the 1952 Act were substantial,
they were largely procedural in character. The changes effected by the
1958 Revision, however, are so far-reaching as greatly to enlarge the
usefulness of the practice authorized thereunder. It is important that
our 1959 legislature heed the recommendation of the State Bar that the
Act in its latest approved form be adopted in Montana, at least to the
extent of carefully considering its improvements over our present law. A
detailed analysis of its principal changes, therefore, is very much in order.
However, since we have been operating under the 1950 Act to the present,
further consideration of some of the questions and difficulties which have
become apparent since our analysis of the Act in 1954, will help to demonstrate the need for the Revised Act. This state experience will follow a
brief summary of developments at the national level.
Any doubts that may have lingered in the minds of some as to the general constitutionality of this legislation should be dispelled by a series of
leading decisions rendered within the past two years. An excellent decision
by the New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of its reciprocal procedure on all counts, and a Connecticut court sustained it
against attacks based on "due process.'" A very recent Missouri ease also
*Professor of Law, Montana State University. B.S., Oklahoma A. & M. College,
1927; LL.B., University of Oklahoma, 1932; LL.M., Harvard University, 1935.

'Briggs, The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in Montana, 15 MONT. L. REv.
40
(1954).
2
Landes v. Landes, 1 N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562 (1956) ; appeal disml~sed, 352 U.S.
948 (1956) ; Proctor v. Sachner, 143 Conn. 9, 118 A.2d 621 (1955).
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upheld it against charges of unconstitutionality.' A Maine case affirmed the validity of the provision subjecting to its jurisdiction a defendant who has never been in the initiating state.' A Missouri court wrongly
decided that this Act is not available for collecting accrued alimony based
on a divorce decree, but a Florida case correctly ruled to the contrary, generally," though the precise issue was whether the Reciprocal Act was available to enforce a duty of support raised by the divorce decree of one Florida
court, in another Florida court, at the defendant's residence. It ruled the
Act applicable in all cases to enforce alimony payments (relying partly
on section 27 of the 1952 Revision). In 1954 California ruled correctly that
a defendant cannot initiate a civil action against himself, in the responding
state, to avoid being subjected to an extradition request. Ohio also supports
this rule. But in 1957 Florida took a contrary position in a very unsatisfactory decision.'
Since considerable controversy has developed on this
question, as to what the law ought to provide, it will be discussed further
below.
Two good decisions, one from Minnesotae and one from New Jersey,'
recently considered at length the complicating question of duty of support,
as affected by alleged interference of visitatorial rights of the defendant
father. A 1955 New Jersey decision and a 1956 Missouri case confirm the
fact that the only court with power to adjudicate on the duty issue is the
responding court." These cases develop a doctrine under which the Act may
be administered with general effectiveness. '
A spot check on Montana practice, from county attorneys' offices, indicates that summary process still is used generally to assert jurisdiction over
the defendant.'
However our earlier conclusion that the defendant
iq entitled to demand service by summons, as in an ordinary civil action,
with possible supplementary process by citation, has influenced the practice
m
in at least a few counties.
" Recently, the question of the variety and scope
of duties of support enforceable under the Act was adjudicated in Yellowstone County. In a proceeding from Pennsylvania, to require a daughter
in Montana to provide support for her mother in Pennsylvania, though the
'Ivey v. Ayers, 301 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1957).
'Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Me. 161, 125 A.2d 863 (1956).
5Welch v. McIntosh, 290 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1956).
'Thompson v. Thompson, 93 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1957).
'Id. at 93.
"Exparte Floyd, 43 Cal.2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1952).
'Sands v. Sands, 136 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio, 1956).
"Jackson v. Hall, 97 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
"Shannon v. Sterling, 248 Minn. 266, 80 N.W.2d 13 (1957).
"Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 123 A.2d 3 (1956).
"Missouri ex tel. Whatley v. Mueller, 288 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1956) Pfueller v. Pfueller,
37 N.J. Super. 106, 117 A.2d 30 (1955).
"Every county attorney's office should subscribe for the information manuel published annually by The Council of State Governments, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, and entitled, "Reciprocal State Legislation to Enforce the Support
of Dependents." In addition to a great deal of other information, it summarizes
annually the leading reciprocal enforcement decisions the country over.
"We only inquired of offices in most of the more populated counties. Yellowstone
and Lewis and Clark Counties indicated that they still use the citation.
"Only one county, Cascade, actually stated that they had modelled their process after

that suggested in Briggs, The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in Montana,

15 MONT. L. 1Kv. 40,52-56 (1954).
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court found the daughter unable to so provide, the district court apparently
adopted the correct rule that the Act applies to every person who owes a
duty of support to another under the Montana law, which is enforceable
under the Act." This confirms our earlier interpretation,' simply giving
the only permissible construction to the Act's definition of "duty of support. "
A recent case decided in Yellowstone County,"9 and described by one of
its special deputies, merits attention because of the variey of issues it raises,
some of which the writer considered in the earlier study. Here, the defendant was "cited into Court," and served with an order to show cause, along
with copies of the papers filed from Oregon, the petitioning state. The
defendant made special appearance via a motion to quash, based on the following contentions:*
1. That the petition failed to recite sufficient facts to constitute
a cause of action against the defendant.
2. That the court in Multnomah County, Oregon, acted without
jurisdiction in that "The original jurisdiction over the defendant
and over the cause of action was in the said District Court of the
Thirteen Judicial District," the reason being that the divorce was
obtained here in Yellowstone County and the support act did not
contemplate this situation when the same court retained jurisdiction over the parties and children of the parties by the divorce
action itself.
3. That the order to show cause was not the proper method to
bring the respondent before the court.
4. That the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon exceeded its
jurisdiction over the respondent in finding facts, and in declaring
a duty to support.
The attorney describes the results thus:
Briefs were submitted in this matter and the Judge, after research and argument, issued an Order denying each and every
point raised by the Respondent.
This decision, in effect, approved the Order to Show Cause
as a means to bring the Respondent into Court. It abandoned the
theory that the divorce court in this state should have exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of child support and [held] that
the support act could be-used concurrently with the divorce action.
It found that the Oregon findings were sufficient to come within
the contemplation of the statute in Montana and that the Petition
did state facts in which to bring the Respondent into Court.
The court's ruling that the divorcing court may be requested to exercise jurisdiction, either under its original and continuing jurisdiction or
under the Reciprocal Act is correct and desirable. In ruling, apparently,
that though the Oregon Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the issues
"According to my informant, this case was decided recently in Billings, Montana.
"'Briggs, supra note 16, at 47, particularly at.n. 22, and comment therein.
I"My correspondent informs me that this case was decided In Billings about November 18, 1958.

'qTese are given as summarized In my informant's letter.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958
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or make affirmative findings of fact, those portions should be treated as
surplusage and the effect intended under the Act should be given to the
papers filed, this Montana case also is correct. It is in accord both with
the conclusions of our earlier article on this point,' and with the Missouri
and New Jersey cases cited above.' It apparently rules correctly that the
complaint is sufficient, measured by Montana standards. As to the sufficiency of the citation and show cause order as originating process, the
doubt we have expressed elsewhere' on the adequacy of this process, alone,
is based on the strong possibility that our own Supreme Court would sustain
an attack on that ground. This is because under our Code this Act may be
found to give rise to an ordinary civil action, supported by summons. We
have not questioned the auxiliary value of the citation, provided the defendant is granted ample time to prepare his case on a contested issue.'
In deciding that a divorcing court may be asked to exercise its jurisdiction for enforcement either under its contining jurisdiction or under the
Reciprocal Act, the above case touches upon the most serious problem dealt
with in Montana to my knowledge-one for which the Act offers no direct
answer, and little guidance, beyond its general policy. These facts pose the
problem: W secures a divorce with alimony, for the support of W and
minor children, at the family domicile in Y County. W then moves to
Washington state, with the children. H, her former husband, moves to R
County, where he engages in business. Upon H's default in the payment
of alimony for four months, W files a complaint under the Reciprocal Act
in Washington, as the initiating state. The Washington court transmits the
relevant papers to the Montana District Court for R County, as responding
court. The officials administering the Act in R County insist that they
have neither duty nor power to exercise jurisdiction under the Reciprocal
Act in this case. The argument supporting this view runs thus: "The
entire intent of the Act appears to be that the initiating state requests the
responding state to proceed with trial only in those cases where it is necessary to determine for the first time that the defendant owes a duty of support. (Of course, if valid at all, this would exclude all reciprocal actions
based on prior judicial decrees, which are included under the Act by its
express terms.)' It is conceded that by the order of the District Court in
and for Y County the fact that the defendant owes a duty of support has
already been established and determined. Further, the proper procedure
is to direct the Washington papers to the divorcing court in Y County, so
as to be able to proceed originally and initially for contempt of that court,
for citation for contempt at the outset is clearly impossible in R County,
which must first again determine that he owes a duty of support, and then
cite for contempt upon his failure to comply." This argument may also
1958]

"'Apparently the courts of Multnomah County, Oregon, are still using the forms for
initiating suit which were critically examined in Briggs, supra note 16, at 69.
2Note 13 8upra.

23Briggs, 8upra note 16.
'Id.at 54-56.

'5REVISE CODES Or MONTANA, 1947 (Hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947), § 94-901-2(6)
provides: "'Duty of support' includes any duty of support imposed or imposable
by law, or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether Interlocutory or final,
whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial [legal] separation, separate
maintenance or otherwise."
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urge that "the extradition sanction could not be used by Washington in
this type case."
On the last two minor points, I agree that contempt citation would not
be summarily aavilable in R County, except as changed by statute. I reject the argument on power to request extradition. The Act does not require that the defendant ever have been in Washington to be subject to an
extradition request. This serves to put added "bite" in its civil action, if
there is jurisdiction otherwise under the Act. Section 5, providing for such
request, is equally available to Washington.
On the primary question of whether the court in R County either must
or should accept the papers transmitted and proceed to trial, our conclusion,
with its supporting reasons, appear in some detail in the Appendix attached
to this study. But a summary of those reasons may be stated thus:
1. Both a literal and a reasonable interpretation of the Reciprocal Act itself requires that conclusion;
2. There is no legal prohibition against such exercise, constitutional or otherwise;
3. Neither is there any such long established practice in the exercise of a court's continuing divorce jurisdiction as to raise a
presumption against such legislative intent-there is no infringement nor conflict in the exercise of each jurisdiction by the respective courts.
4. The question would be more difficult if the divorcing court
were to insist that it could exercise no jurisdiction under the Reciprocal Act-that its only jurisdiction is that continuing in it as the
divorcing court-though Yellowstone County has ruled that it can
exercise either jurisdiction alternately.'
We do suggest one limitation on the defendant's residence court, as responding court, under the above facts, which would not be present if the divorcing court were a foreign court, which likewise has been objected to by officials administering the Act. It merits special mention here because the
question may survive, even under the 1958 Revision of the Act. The problem is that, although if a foreign decree were the basis for the duty the
Montana court would be free to enter an independent order as to the measure of that duty for the future, since here it is a "local" decree with full
inherent efficacy throughout the state, probably the residence court should
consider itself bound by the terms of the original decree, continuing to measure the defendant's liability strictly according to its terms, and requiring
the defendant to raise in the Y County court the issue of whether the
amount due should be modified. This too has been challenged.
In 1955 I was informed that the Yellowstone County Attorney's office
had a well established practice of accepting jurisdiction under our hypothetical facts, where it is asked to exercise such jurisdiction as the residence
court, rather than as the divorcing court, on the ground that it in no way
abridges the divorce court's jurisdiction, but is rather in further aid and
assistance in the more effective enforcement thereof. I also am assured
"The information that this is the practice in Yellowstone County, is contained in a
letter received from the County Attorney there, December 5, 1955.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958
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that at least one Montana court,' as the divorcing court, has refused to exercise jurisdiction under the Reciprocal Act on the ground that the only
court as responding court with jurisdiction is the defendant's residence
court. It seems, however, that Yellowstone County assumes in such case
that it has competence to make an indepndent finding on the measure of
the duty for the future."
Extended amendments proposed for three major sections, plus the
whole of the entirely new Part IV of the 1958 Revision, have an important
bearing on this question; further discussion thereof will therefore be postponed until formal consideration of those proposed amendments. This
brings us to a consideration of the Act itself.
Of course we are interested in all the changes made in the 1950 Act (our
present one), by both the 1952 and the 1958 revisions, incorporated in the
Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August, 1958. The bulk of the 1952 amendments were largely procedural and administrative-to make the Act work more effectively.
Since we considered them in some detail in the earlier article,la we shall
only summarize them here. The 1952 Act requires more detailed information to help identify the defendant,' provides for the setting up of machinery to serve as information agencies and to expedite the determination of
th proper responding court,' vests the court with discretionary power to
charge the state with costs,' provides for physical detention of the defendant in certain cases,' makes explicit the duty of the appropriate enforcement officer to represent the petitioner,m and simplifies the "choice of law"
problem, though it is still not altogether satisfactory on this point." In addition to preserving these improvements in the 1950 Act, the 1958 Revision
makes broad and sweeping changes in substantive portions of the Act, greatly enlarging the scope of the jurisdiction to be exercised thereunder and
providing for other changes almost as revolutionary in principle as the
"two court" trial procedure provided for by the original Act. For a summary statement of these changes one hardly can improve upon that given
in simple language in the Commissioners' Prefatory Note, introducing the
Draft Act, as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, in August, 1958 :"
Section 6 suggests that, before going through the criminal
procedure of extradition, which is unlikely to produce actual sup'Ibid. Roosevelt County had granted the original divorce'and refused to exercise
any jurisdiction under the Reciprocal Act, on the ground the defendant's residence
court has not only primary but exclusiVe jurisdiction thereunder.
"Ibid. The Yellowstone office stated that they considered the amount of support
set in the divorce the maximum permitted, but that the residence court can take
into account the defendant's present circumstances to determine how much it will
T enforce.
aBriggs, supra note 16, at 59-66.
tmUNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT, §§ 10, 18 (as amended in 1952).
°Id. at § 16.
'Id. at § 14.
t

a Id. at § 15.
m

Id. at § 11.
"Id.
at §§ 4, 11.
1

UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (as

amended in 1958), "Com-

missioners' Prefatory Note" 3, 4.
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port money for the family, the Governor allow enough time
for the family to take advantage of the available civil remedy.
Section 9 makes it clear that under the act not only current
support but also arrearages may be recovered.
Section 15 provides that there shall be no filing fee or other
costs taxable to the obligee.
Section 19 permits the forwarding of the plaintiff's papers
not only to another county in the same state but also to another
county in another state where the defendant or his property may
be found. Heretofore it was necessary to file a new initiating
petition in such a case.
The changes made by Section 21 are important. Heretofore
courts and prosecuting attorneys were uncertain how to proceed
in a case where the defendant filed his answer and gave evidence.
The plaintiff was in another state. The judge had before him
nothing but the complaint. It was not evidence and the defendant having produced evidence sufficient for a defense the judge
would often dismiss the case. Under the new Section 21, the judge
now must "continue the case for further hearing and the submission of evidence by both parties." What is contemplated here is
that the prosecuting attorney or other representative of the plaintiff shall use the machinery of deposition and interrogatories, as
permitted by the law of the state, to obtain evidence from the absent plaintiff, or her witnesses, then permit the defendant to give
further oral evidence in reply and possibly use the machinery of
deposition and interrogatories again to obtain further evidence
from the plaintiff, etc.
Section 24 permits the enforcement of an order of support in
every county of the state.
Section 32 permits the Act to be used when the parties are not
in different states but merely in different counties of the same
state.
The act, in several places, provides for a better distribution of
the duties of courts, clerks of court and prosecuting attorneys to
the end that non-judicial duties are not imposed upon courts.
Sections 33 to 38 are entirely new. They constitute a new
Part IV of the Act. They provide for the registration in the courts
of one state of support orders issued by the courts of another state.
The support order, so registered, has the same effect and may be
enforced as if it had been originally issued by a court of the registering state. Of course the defendant may oppose the registration,
but he may assert only a defense available to a defendant in an
action on a foreign judgment. He cannot oppose registration on
the ground that the support order is not a final judgment, because a "support order" is defined (in Section 2) as "any judgment, decree or order of support whether temporary or final,
whether subject to modification, revocation or remission regardless of the kind of action in which it is entered."
Thus Part IV is very important. It permits enforcement in
the courts of every state passing this act of support orders from
other states as if they were locally issued.
To these should be added the provision of section 29, that a reciprocal enforcement proceeding is not to be stayed pending other more or less related
actions, such as diyorce, custody, etc.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958
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The 1958 Revision continues the division of the Act into the three
Parts, found in the earlier versions, and adds a Part IV which makes some
extremely important new law in the field of judments. No major changes,
however, occur in the first five sections. There is nothing in section 6, as
amended, to suggest the hotly contested discussions which have gone on
in the annual conferences of various interested organizations as to just
what the policy should be concerning extradition requests for a "nonsupporter." The controversy developed from an amendment to the Uniform Act, by Arizona, permitting a defendant there, in effect, to initiate
a civil action against himself in the responding state so as to stay the
extradition proceedings, where the state requesting the extradition failed
to begin a companion civil action.' There is no doubt that the Uniform
Act did not contemplate any such procedure.' Arizona readily recognized
this in finding an amendment necessary. But the practice caught the fancy
of some interested presons, and the argument was on . The 1958 form of
section 6 makes it clear that the original idea that the defendant not be
allowed any such recourse has prevailed, with a suggestive proviso-an
advisory to the Governor that it might be well for him at least to delay
extradition for a considerable time, if no civil action has been filed, to be
sure that the interested parties have had all the time they could possibly
need to file one. We noted in 1954 that the refusal to so file might influence
the Governor in the exercise of his discretion."
But there is a fundamental policy issue hidden in the debris of the
contoversy which has been waged, that most if not all of the disputants
have failed to note. Comments on section 6, as revised, generally stress
the fact that the language is advisory only-"the Governor may delay
honoring the demand for reasonable time to permit prosecution of an
action for support, "' suggesting that his constitutional prerogatives under
article IV, section 2, of the United States Constitution compel this treatment.' But does this position sufficiently take into account the fundamental distinction between the fleeing felon, with only which the Constitution deals, and "one who has never been inside the requesting state, dealt
with by the legislature only"? Discussion generally lumps these two to-

'195 8

Proposed Amendments to the UNiFoRM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT

ACT (as amended in 1952) (Tent. Draft No. 2 with Prefatory Note and Comments),
Editorial Comment to Section VI, 8-10.
"?Note 29 supra; Briggs, supra note 16, at 68-69.
8
Briggs, supra note 16, at 69.
tmUNIFORM RECIPROCAL

ENFORCEMENT

OF SUPPORT ACT

§

6(c) (as amended in 1958).

note 36 supra at 9, 10. Much of the detail in section 6, as proposed in this Second
Tentative Draft, was revised by the Commissioners before approving it. See Summary, Northeastern Regional Sapport Conference, New York City, October 10, 1958
(The Council of State Governments, 522 Fifth Ave., N. Y. 36, N.Y.), 5-3, for an interesting discussion of section 6, which assumes that the regulations in section 6
al)ply to all extradition requests based on non-support. The Massachusetts and New
Jersey delegations expressed belief that requesting officials should have discretion
to request extradition without civil proceedings. A Council of State Governments'
representative, "reminded the group that the suggested amendment permitted discretion on the part of the Governor so that extradition might take place in special
cases without the civil remedy having been tried first." Id. at 3.
"Note 36 supra, at 9, 10.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/12
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gether indiscriminately.' Certainly, the governmental interests of a requesting state are much more substantial toward a "fleeing felon," who
has just committed acts within its community resulting in a broken,
abandoned and stranded family there, than are its interests toward "one
who has never been within the state." The instincts of section 6 are sound
in apparently leaving an ultimate discretion in the requesting state to
determine when the policies of its criminal law require vindiction. (Of
course this is not to suggest that criminal action is desirable ordinarilyor in any particular case.) But the controversy has not sufficiently clarified the issues, to the present, to assure the sound implementation of policy
for the future.
In 1954 we discussed the question dealt with in proposed section 9,
expressly declaring that accrued alimony as well as all other forms of
support are collectible under the Act. There we took the position that even
the 1950 Act clearly contemplated this without such express provision.'
And in editorial comment the Drafting Committee was able in 1952 to
declare that "lawyers are becoming increasingly aware that the Act
supplies a convenient method for the collection of alimony and separate
maintenance. "" Nevertheless, the reluctance of Montana officials to allow
such proceeding in Montana seems to have persisted throughout the country
generally all too often, thus requiring this explicit provision. That point
should now be settled beyond doubt.
As noted above, the most serious limitation on the effectiveness of
the Reciprocal Act, noted most frequently by its administrators in Montana, is that of costs assessed against the plaintiff by many states." (Though
generally charging the fees under our present law, Montana sometimes
gives foreign petitioners the benefit of an in forma pauperis plea.)" Section
15 of the proposed revision unconditionally provides that "there shall be
no filing fee or other costs taxable to the obligee." This comes after six
years experience with the discretionary rule which had left this matter
to the judge in 1952. Thus section 15 will end the most common complaint.
However, for better or for worse, there may be a latent ambiguity in the
term "obligee" found therein. A cursory examination of the Act would
suggest that the term has been used loosely and inaccurately as synonymous with "plaintiff or petitioner," so as to include all such without
"Note 39 supra. Of course, if section 6 be interpreted as not restricting in any way
the right of the requesting state to request extradition under the statutes governing
extradition generally, the discretion which we have suggested should continue to
be vested in the requesting state is preserved; but, as indicated above, at least arguably, section 6 is framed to apply to all extradition requests based on non-support.
See note 39 supra. See also Jackson v. Hall, 97 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1957), for a leading
Florida case illustrating the general tendency to make no distinction between "fleeing felon" and "non-fleeing felon" cases: ". . . we can find no valid reason for construing the Act as giving to the demanding state and the obligee the option of requiring the obligor to answer a criminal charge and be punished in a state in which
he may never have resided." Id. at 3.
'uBriggs, supra note 16, at 66-67.
"Note 29 supra, EditorialComment to section 14, at 13.
'4"This was true both in 1954 and 1958, as revealed by correspondence.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, RECIPROCAL STATE LEGISLATION TO ENFORCE THE

SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS 15 (1958 ed.), cites Montana as not waiving any fees. Cf.
Briggs, supra note 16, at 61, where we state our finding that in spite of an Attorney
General's Opinion to that effect, at least some Counties grant the right to sue in
forma pauperis. Current correspondence confirms that practice.
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exception. It seemingly has been so used in several sections" in spite of
the clear definitional pronouncement that 'Obligee' means any person to
whom a duty of support is owed.""' Clearly this does not include all plaintiffs. Furthermore, in most if not all of the other sections in which the term
seemingly is used synonymously with "plaintiff," it appears that the
subject matter thereof permits the assumption that the "plaintiff" has a
provable claim in fact. Such assumption, however, is not permissible in
the context of section 15. Further, there is a substantionl policy question
of whether costs should be assessed against some one else in all cases, regardless of whether the proceeding has been filed in good or in bad faith.
In any case, it seems that legislative policy on this matter should be clarified by more carefully selected language.
Sections 18 through 27 enumerate the powers and duties of the state's
courts, acting as responding courts. Section 18 imposes the same affirmative duties to enforce the Act on the "prosecuting attorney" is the responding state, as did section 12 in the initiating state. Though the 1952
Revision intended to make clear such duty is sections 11 and 17,_ the present
sections state the duty even more affirmatively and explicitly. The provisions of section 19, requiring the responding court to forward at once
all revelant documents to the court where the defendant is found, when
neither he nor his property is found locally, adds force to the obvious
policy of the Act that the court at the defendant's residence should be
treated as the court of primary jurisdiction, and to the Act's determination that effective jurisdiction over the defendant should be sought and
established in the most expeditious manner possible. This procedural development has been requested by various people administering or interested
in the Act," and is a very sensible and marked improvement on its earlier
versions, under which, in such cases, the plaintiff had to start all over
again. We shall refer further to this developing procedure in another
connection.
Section 21 declares that if the plaintiff is absent "and the (defendant)
presents evidence constituting a defense, the court shall continue the case
for further hearing and the submission of evidence by both parties." This
is deemed quite important, in that it makes impossible the practice by
some courts of dismissing the action immediately if the defendant answers
with a denial and supporting evidence. The approved draft does not adopt
the theory of the drafting committtee in its June, 1958, draft," that it
is either necessary or desirable to declare that plaintiff's complaint, with
supporting evidence, should be deemed to establish a prima facie case, so
as to support a "default judgment." The approved section considers it
enough simply to declare expressly that the hearing shall be continued
so as to give both parties an opportunity to submit evidence. Of course,
those trying to administer the Act realistically have developed such practice anyway under the earlier versions thereof.
"Note 35 supra,§§ 4, 7, 8, 9, 19.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 94-901-2(8) ;note 35 supra, § 2(h).
'"Note 36 supra, at 19, Editorial Comment to Section 19: "The changes . . . have been
proposed by at least two Annual Conferences on Reciprocal Support called by the
Council of State Governments . . .[and] by counsel for the Legal Aid Society of
Philadelphia and many others."
"Id. at 19, 20, with Editorial Comment.
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As section 19 tries to guarantee that all relevant documents will
"pursue" the defendant for trial as quickly and directly as possible,
wherever he may be found, so section 24 intends similarly to guarantee
enforcement in the same expeditious manner in providing that,
If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support,
it may order the (respondent) to furnish support or reimbursement therefor and subject the property of the (respondent) to
such order.
The court and (prosecuting attorney) of any county where
the obligor is present or has property have the same powers and
duties to enforce the order as have those of the county where it
was first issued. If enforcement is impossible or cannot be completed in the county where the order was issued, the (prosecuting
attorney) shall transmit a certified copy of the order to the (prosecuting attorney) of any county where it appears that procedures to enforce payment of the amount due would be effective ....
"
There are two things of particular interest, concerning this section.
Read literally, it applies only to a court which finds a "duty of support,"
while acting as a responding court. Secondly, thus limited, it provides
that such order shall be equally summarily enforceable in any county
within the state (presumably), in the same manner as if originally rendered
by the enforcing court. It thus enlarges the enforcement arm of the rendering court to the entire state, through the instrumentality of every other
court within the state where enforcement may be effective. This is a very
desirable development in judicial procedure, but may not be quite as
broad as is desired, in that it does not make the same provision for the
summary enforcement of support orders rendered incidentally to a prior
divorce decree by another Montana court. But more of that later.
Section 29 adds an interesting and probably worthwhile provision
to the 1958 Revision in providing that suit under the Act cannot be
"stayed" pending the outcome of another action for "divorce, separation,
annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus or custody proceeding." In the Act's
past administration, some courts have permitted intolerable delays for
this reason. Once those proceedings are completed, any resulting support
order may supersede the local order of support, under other sections. Indeed, section 30 expressly provides that no support order issued by a responding court shall supersede any other order of support, but payment
thereon satisfies pro tanto payment on the other."
Section 31 is a new optional section protecting either party against
the possibility of being subjected to the personal jurisdiction of the court
in any other kind of proceeding as a result of his participation in the
proceeding under this Act. Except for this express prohibition, such
subjection would be possible under the law and procedure of some states,
which would result in an unfortunate hampering in the voluntary participation of the parties under this Act.
6Note 35 supra, § 19, at 9, 10. The bracketed portion of the section, as quoted, is
an optional provision which should be adopted.
"Briggs, supra note 16, at 67.
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Section 32 introduces the greatest innovation found in the first
three Parts of the Act. It makes the proceedings authorized under the
Reciprocal Act applicable to inter-county suits for support within the
enacting state, as well as between states. Thereunder, the plaintiff may
file a complaint in her residence county, as the initiating county, subjecting its enforcement officials to the duty to transmit all relevant documents to the defendant's residence county, as responding county, obligating its officials to proceed with the trial under the same procedure as
when two states are involved.
This further enlarges the field in which the law is "socialized," but
probably is justified by the similarity in difficulty of suit between distant
counties within the same state, particularly where the state is large as
is Montana, and of suit between two states. There is substantially the same
reason for resorting to the "two court" proceeding in the one as in the
other. Moreover, the likelihood of the dependants becoming public charges
is equally great in both cases.'
Part IV of this Act achieves a major revolution in the law regulating
the enforcement of foreign judgments. In six very short sections it provides still another remedy by setting up a routine procedure for registering
in local courts foreign support orders of every kind, presumably including
alimony decrees incidental to foreign divorces.
Section 36 creates" additional remedies" by authorizing the "obligee"
to "register" any foreign support order in the "Registry of Foreign Support Orders," maintained by each clerk of court, as provided for in sections
33, 34 and 35. Section 36 then describes the "petition for registration,"
and requires that it be verified, show the "amount remaining unpaid," and
be accompanied by a list of other registrations thereof. All the foregoing
documents must be supported by a "certified copy of the support order,
along with all modifications thereof." Such order is "registered on the
filing of the (complaint) subject only to subsequent order of confirmation."
Dealing with the procedure for such "confirmation,"
section 37
wisely requires the use of the ordinary civil process to subject the defendant
to the court's jurisdiction, and allows him to "assert any defense available
in an action on a foreign judgment. " If the defendant defends, the
judge adjudicates the issues, including the amounts, if any, remaining
unpaid. On default he enters a confirmation of the registered support
order, also determining unpaid amounts. Section 38 gives such registered
order the same standing as if it were originally rendered by the local
court, entitling it to the same summary enforcement, including citation
"'Itmay be objected that this section unfairly discriminates between a plaintiff
suing a foreign defendant for support and one suing a defendant in the same county, as to expenses for the suit. Therefore, goes the argument, the state should assume suit costs in all support orders. However, although the state's economic interests are the same in each, the difficulties In suing are very different; the classification probably is a reasonable one under the "equal protection clause." See
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936) ; Old Colony R. Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 439, 35 N.E.2d 246 (1941). Of. G.G. & S.F. Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). And in any case, since the essential subject of this
Act Is the "two court" proceeding, this is not the place to enlarge further the socializing of the law in such manner.
"Note, however, that he cannot defend on the ground that the "alimony award is
not final." See note 35 spra, Cowmissioners' Prefatory Note, at 4, and § 2(j),
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for contempt on non-compliance. These last provisions are of the utmost
importance.
These sections constitute a major breach in the time honored common law rule that any plaintiff seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment must sue in debt." This general rule applies with full force in an
action to recover alimony, imposed in a divorce action. The plaintiff can
recover only in debt for the accrued amount, and has to bring a new action
for each additional accrual.' Furthermore, though a very few courts have
liberalized their practice, the forum generally refuses to exercise anything
in the nature of a continuing jurisdiction to give any effect to the foreign
decree--i.e., the foreign decree as such, has had no standing whatever in
court as a judgment and has not been entitled to summary enforcement
for any purpose."
California is a leading jurisdiction in giving "more faith and credit"
to this essentially equitable decree than is required by full faith and credit.
Their leading cases have approved much the same practice' under a common
law development as is prescribed here in Part IV, recognizing the foreign
decree upon "registration," as having exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the duties of the defendant, and enforcing those duties in the same way
as if it had rendered the original support order.' Moreover, its practice
also expressly provides for the immediate filing of any subsequent modification thereof, made by the rendering court. '
The profound character of the change which Part IV makes in the
existing Reciprocal Enforcement Acts is revealed by the fact that under
those Acts the responding court not only has refused to give any kind
of summary enforcement to the foreign decree, but has even exercised
jurisdiction to grant a support order quite at variance with the requirements of the foreign order ' and some courts have even insisted that the
collection of accrued alimony, based on foreign divorce decrees does not
come within the jurisdiction of the Acts. '
6

Neilman v. Poe, 138 Md. 482, 114 Atl. 568 (1921) ; 3

FnIE-MAN, JUDGMENTS

2799,

2801 (5th ed. Tuttle 1925) ; CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REFSE, CASES ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS 255 (3d ed. 1951).
'
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901).
"Ibid.
"Established in Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929), this
practice is affirmed in later cases. Thomas v. Thomas, 14 Cal. 2d 355, 94 P.2d 810
(19,39) ; Palen v. Palen, 12 Cal. App. 2d 357, 55 P.2d 228 (1936). Several other
jurisdictions have held that a foreign alimony decree will be enforced with the
same equitable sanctions, such as contempt and sequestration, as are available for
the enforcement of a local decree. Annot. 97 A.L.R. 1197 (1935) ; Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P.2d 446 (1935) : Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252
N.W. 449 (1934) ; German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 Atl. 429 (1936), 125 Conn.
84, 3 A.2d 849 (1938).
"Unfortunately, though our Supreme Court had an excellent opportunity to adopt
the same practice here in a very important case some years ago, it misunderstood
the rationale upon which the California courts have operated, and completely misapplied the doctrines Involved. See Espeland v. Espeland, 111 Mont. 365, 109 P.2d
792 (1941), as commented on in Scott, The Enforcement of Foreign Decreeg for Alimonyj, 4 MoNT. L. REv. 77 (1943).
"Cummings
v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929).
0'Briggs, 8upra note 16, at 66-67. Correspondence with various enforcement officers
has revealed this practice.
'Ibid. Of course section 9 expressly required the exercise of such jurisdiction quite
independently of Part IV, but only within the limits of traditional doctrine.
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Practically all authorities will agree that these are highly desirable
improvements in the law governing the "enforcement of foreign judgments." By treaty or otherwise, many foreign countries have long provided for the registration or filing of foreign judgments with consequent
summary enforcement available.* This foreign practice is often cited
as establishing the "backwardness" of our general practice in the United
States. Further, both the condensing of these sections and the changes in the
draft presented to the Commissioners by the Drafting Committees are
desirable. The changes require the use of the ordinary civil process to
acquire jurisdiction, and give the defendant "any defense available to
a defendant in an action on a foreign judgment," in the proceeding
to "verify" the order. However, on at least two points some clarification
might more completely articulate the general policy behind Part IV, and
lessen diversity of later interpretation.
Presumably Part IV intends to give a remedy quite independent of
and in addition to those in the first three Parts, dealing with the ordinary
"two court" proceeding for establishing the duty of support for the first
time. Such conclusion is borne out by the declaration in section 33 that
"the obligee has the additional remedries provided in the following sections." It also is supported by section 37, which appears simply to contemplate a proceeding for the purpose of "confirming" the registered
order; upon confirmation such an order "shall have the same effect and
may be enforced as if originally entered in the court of this state." However, an element of ambiquity is injected into these sections by the provision in section 37 that "the foreign support order is registered upon
the filing of the (complaint) " subject only to subsequent order of confirmation." This is the first, last, and only time that "complaint" is referred to in this Part, even suggestively. Elsewhere the only documents
mentioned, are the "petition for registration," and the certified copy
of the foreign support order. Furthermore, though these two documents
might be deemed a sufficient basis for an official confirmatory registration of a support order entitled to be enforced as if originally entered in
the local court, as a practical matter at least, they are not sufficient. Part
IV requires a considerable amount of information concerning the identity
and location of the defendant, which is not furnished by these documents.
That forces a consideration of this question: Does Part IV intend
to provide a self-contained remedy, quite independent of the "two court"
procedure, with the "petition for registration" and the "certified order
of support," constituting all the documents required to bring an action
mReviewing and comparing Australian and United Kingdom practice, in CHEATHAM,
GOODRICH, GaIswoLD & REESE, CASES ON CONFIjCT OF LAWS 256 (3d ed. 1951), the
authors conclude: "Thus, the enforcement of Intra-empire and, In some cases, of international judgments in the United Kingdom is easier than the method now prevailing in this country for the enforcement of sister state judgments." A federal
statute now provides: "A judgment in any action for the recovery of money or
property in any district court which has become final by appeal or expiration of
time for appeal may be registered in any other district by filing therein a certified
copy of such judgment . . . [and] shall have the same effect as a judgment of the
district court of the district where registered and may be enforced In like manner."
But this does not include equity decrees, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. IV 1957).
"Note 35 8upra, at 26-32.
"Emphasis supplied,
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to collect accrued alimony on a foreign judgment? Or is it just assumed that
these documents will accompany an ordinary complaint asking for support
and filed in a foreign state, which will supply the missing information?
If the latter, the description "additional remedies" may not be the most
apt term therefore.' In a real sense these documents become merely incidental to -theclaim for support, made in the complaint, as a type of supporting evidence much more expeditiously establishing the authenticity of the
claim.
But actually, such assumption cannot be granted for every case, because it appears that Part IV intends to apply equally where both the
plaintiff and the defendant are present residents of Montana; such remedy
would be of quite as much value for that plaintiff as for any other. The
plaintiff must not be denied it merely because she is now a resident. If
it be suggested that the answers to these questions should be obvious to
the writer, the real difficulty lies in determining what should be obvious
to the thousands of administrators of this Act, throughout the entire
country.
Another possible defect in the approved draft is that it makes no formal provision for the additional registering of further modifications to
the support order, made by the rendering court subsequent to the initial
registration. Even though it be granted that in the general purpose of
Part IV, and from the nature of the remedy it clearly intends to give,
registration of such modifications must be deemed implied as a routine
requirement, section 38 might well be framed to make that clear.
Even if these suggested changes were made, however, there would
remain still another deficiency in the Act as a whole which perhaps can best
be illustrated by referring again to the problem case previously discussed."
It involved a complaint initiated in the state of Washington and sent
to Y County in Montana, though the claim to support is based on a
divorce and alimony decree rendered by another Montana court in R
county. There is a serious question of whether, with all its improvements,
the 1958 Act provides an entirely adequate procedure for that case. There
is, however, every reason for assuring to a decree of a sister district court,
sitting in Montana, at least as full a measure of exclusive competence in
the delimiting of the scope of the duty of support as is given a foreign
judgment. Yet there is reason to suggest that the Act leaves too much
to the "resourcefulness and imagination" of the administering officials
to solve this problem. Surely experience does not warrant such reliance.'
To formally implement the principle that the original decree rendered
in R County should have at least the same controlling exclusive effect
"Of course, the term "additional remedies" may refer to the fact the foreign support
order is given local summary enforcement after its validity is officially established.
But even thus Interpreted, one may suggest that rather than having more "remedies" the plaintiff has fewer, tecause she does not get the second Independent support order issuing from the responding court that she gets In the ordinary proceeding. (Exactly what does "additional remedies" mean here?)
mText at notes 24-28 supra; Appendix infra.
"Practically universal recognition of the need for "spelling out" the procedures under
the Act, because of lack of resourcefulness In Its administration, has come out of the
great number of national and regional conferences held on the Reciprocal Support
Act over the past eight years. A strong statement thereon Is found in the Draft
Itevision cited note 36 supra, Editorial Comment to section 21, at 20.
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in Y County as would a foreign decree, it is necessary that it be given
exactly the same status in the Y court as has a registered foreign order
of support. Obviously that cannot be done under Part IV, however, because it expressly excludes local decrees. There is also at least serious
question whether it can be done under section 24, which is quoted in text
at note 50 above. That section inaugurates a very salutary procedure
for assuring that a support order shall follow the defendant forthwith,
wherever he may be found within the state. Note that, in terms, this
section applies only to a support order which has been rendered by a
court acting as responding court. Can the second and third sentences of
section 24 be interpreted as being broader than the first sentence (which
limits it to "responding" courts) so as to include any and all support
orders issued in the state, whatever their origin? But even though an
"imaginative" county attorney, when he receives such a foreign complaint based on a Montana divorce, might well develope the salutary
routine practice of writing the rendering court for a certified copy of the
decree and registering it under section 24, and even if Y County thereafter summarily enforced it under a "liberal" construction of section
24, that still would not take care of any of the cases where registration
may be desirable, independently of such foreign complaint.
As stated in the legal memorandum appearing in the appendix to
this article, I have taken the position that even under the 1950 Act
presently governing in Montana a prior decree rendered by a sister
district court should be recognized as exclusively controlling the question
of how much the defendant should have to pay. This contrasts with the
position of foreign judgments which admittedly do not so control locally.
In the former case the Montana court, acting as responding court, does
not have competence to make an independent finding as to how much the
defendant should pay, while in the latter it can and does regularly make
such independent finding. (Of course it will not have that power under
Part IV of the 1958 Act.)
But even if the prior order of support rendered by another Montana
court be given such exclusive competence, and even though the process
and the jurisdiction to enforce judgments vested in Montana courts be
state-wide, unless there is clear and explicit provision made for registering
such decree in other state courts as a matter of course, a prior Montana
divorce and alimony decree may find itself in a less favorable position
in other Montana courts than foreign judgments enjoy. It still is not
supported directly by the power of the court with' primary effective jurisdiction (i.e., the defendant's residence) to cite for contempt. To make
sure that Montana decrees are not placed in such an inferior position,
express language would be appropriate to provide for the registering thereof in other state courts, and to provide that upon registration it shall
have "the same effect and be enforced as if it were originally rendered
by the second court (residence court), with all enforcement procedures,
including the power to cite the defendant for contempt."
Concentrating on the scope and meaning of the various sections in
the Reciprocal Act itself may cause one to forget that such sweeping
changes as have been effected therein may so impinge on other related
portions of our domestic relations law governing strictly local rights and
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duties as to require their "modernizing" also. The concluding remarks
of our 1954 study" called attention to the probable need to "modernize"
those code sections providing for duties of support generally' so as to
assure to the litigants in strictly domestic litigation a clearly stated right
of action to enforce all forms of support duties. So with an ordinary civil
action seemingly available to enforce any duty of support under this Act,"
the same should be true under our code generally.
In extending the remedies and procedures available in the two court
suit under this Act to "inter-county" suits within the state, section
32 only partly "modernizes" local actions. Section 20, introduced as an
"optional section" and providing that "the court shall conduct proceedings . . . in the manner prescribed by law for an action for enforcement of the type of duty of support claimed," simply refers to whatever
present remedies and procedures exist under local law. So even if adopted,
it would not improve our present laws on duties of support. All of this justifies the conclusion that in addition to adopting the 1958 Reciprocal Act,
our legislature also should take a close look at our existing laws dealing
generally with duties of support, and with the manner in which they
can be enforced.
When it is ready to consider our statutes dealing generally with
duties of support, our legislature should examine carefully still another
uniform act, entitled "The Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,"
which was approved only in 1954. In the words of the Council of State
Governments' 1958 manual :'
The purpose of this new uniform act is to set forth in a single,
easily understood statute the basic duties of support which may
be enforced interstate through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. It would be desirable for all states to enact
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act for this reason alone.
In addition, however, it would make possible for the first time
in many states a clear understanding of just what support duties
may be enforced within the state through civil rather than criminal law sanctions.
Although not as urgent a matter in Montana as in many other states,
the problem is important enough and our law incomplete enough that it
should be given high priority in the legislature, particularly since it will
aid considerably the more effective reciprocal enforcement of duties of
support.

"'Briggs, supra note 16, at 77.
wIn their RECIPROCAL STATE

LEGISLATION

TO ENFORCE THE SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS

16-17 (1958 ed.) the Council of State Governments considers the problem of determining what "basic duties of support" are created by the laws of the different
states; and the Council provides a chart summarizing the duties arising under the
laws of each state.
'oNote 35 supra, at § 9.

"Note 69 supra.
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APPENDIX

The following is a memorandum on the questions raised by a complaint filed in a foreign initiating court, based on an alimony decree (i.e.,
support order) originally rendered by Y Montana court, but transmitted
to R Montana court as the defendant's present residence court, for enforcement therein. Not only does it consider a continuously practical problem so
long as our 1951 statute governs, but it also is relevant in any appraisal
of the scope of Part IV proceeding for registering a "foreign judgment."
I understand your position to be that the District Court in R County has no
jurisdiction to grant any part of the relief prayed for in the complaint received from
Washington-that is, that the only proper court in Montana to exercise any competence under the Reciprocal Act must be the original divorcing court. I submit
that your court should find that it has jurisdiction for the following reasons:
1.
2.
3.

Both a literal and a reasonable interpretation of the Reciprocal Act itself
requires that conclusion;
There is no legal prohibition against such exercise, constitutional or otherwise;
Neither is there any such long established practice in the exercise of a court's
continuing divorce jurisdiction as to raise a presumption against such legislative intent.

First, as to the language and apparent purpose of the Act. The "duties of support" enforcible under the Act are defined in section 1 (6), as including those arising
from court decrees, judgments and orders of every kind, as well as all other kinds
"imposed or imposable by law." Hence, the fact that this particular plaintiff seeks
in part to recover for accrued alimony is no bar whatsoever to the bringing of the
action. Indeed, though discussing the paying of fees, editorial comment under section 14 of the 1952 Act declares that "lawvyers are becoming Increasingly aware that
the Act supplies a convenient method for the collection of alimony and separate
maintenance." As I state in my article, this may well prove one of the most valuable
uses of the Act. This would seem, likewise, to dispose of your latter argument that
the Reciprocal Act applies only to a trial to determine whether the defendant in
fact owes a duty of support. The fact that a prior judgment has fully established
the existence of the duty in no way limits the scope of the Act. Obviously every
suit for accrued alimony is simply an action for debt as is any action on a money
judgment, the existence of which debt must be re-determined in every new action.
Of course, the defendant may have any number of defenses. He may have paid or
he may contend that the Y court never did acquire jurisdiction over him. Hence
you cannot extra-judicially assume the existence of such duty in every such case.
However, the question remains whether the request should be made to the
court rendering the original alimony decree, or to the district court in which the
defendant is at present found. Everything in the Act points to the latter. The
actual language of sections 94-901-11 and -12 clearly includes the court at the defendant's residence, where he can generally be found. Almost certainly the framers of
the Act were thinking in terms of a case where the responding court would have
"to obtain jurisdiction" over the defendant for the first time. We shall consider
shortly the question of whether it is broad enough to include the court originally
granting the alimony in the alternative.
This construction is a most reasonable one in view of the over all purpose of
the Act, and of the duties given the responding court to collect and remit payments
regularly from the defendant without interfering with his working conditions. Although it be true that the court granting the alimony may have a continuing jurisdiction over both the defendant and the subject matter, this is a technical jurisdiction
only, which does not well serve the requirements of the Act. The general object of
the Act is to bring pressure to bear on the defendant, disturbing him physically as
little as possible as a wage earner. Granted that the divorcing court may order
execution and issue a decree ordering him to pay, which will support a citation
for contempt for non-compliance, in fact these things do not produce payment or support money until we actually get hold of the defendant. How better and how more
expeditiously can we do that, than to have process issued directly from the court
of his current residence? Restating in summary, the duties placed both on him and
on the court by sections 91-901-15 and -16 can best be performed by his current home
court, with less delay and cost and loss of time to everybody concerned.
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Where the divorcing court is in another state than where the defendant is now
found, why do you not insist that that court be required to serve as the "responding
court"? It has just as much "continuing jurisdiction" over the defendant, technically. as it has in this case. It can issue execution, as well as an order to pay, and
can cite the defendant for contempt if he does not pay-though the U. S. Supreme
Court recently has set limits on this power. It is only a partial answer to say that
it is not In a position where sitting in a foreign state to enforce Its contempt citation,
while it can here. As a practical matter it may be in only a little better position in
the present case. While Y and R are contiguous, two courts might be 600 miles apart
and still be within the state of Montana. Even here it Is submitted that the R court
is in a better position to be really effective and to best implement the over-all objectives of the Act.
If this be true, there only remains the question of whether there either is some
fundamental rule in the law prohibiting the exercise of such jurisdiction by the R
court, or there is such a universal practice looking only to the court granting the
original award as to raise a very strong presumption against such legislative intent
in passing the Recipocal Enforcement Act. A blunt and positive no to both of these
suggestions seems proper.
Even if there were some basis for claiming that the divorcing court's jurisdiclion over the subject matter cannot constitutionally be limited, there Is no such
limitation here. The divorcing court continues to possess every jurisdictional power
it ever possessed. No one that I know of has ever suggested that a suing in state
Iton a state .4 alimony award for accrued alimony impinged In any manner on the
jurisdiction of the state A court. It Is clearly recognized that such action simply
is in further aid of the state A court and the enforcement of its award. The quite
generally favored practice today, In such Interstate actions, is for the B court to
accept the A judgment as a continuing basis for all further summary enforcement
in I, making the A judgment a matter of record, and treating it as essentially its
own for purposes of enforcement subject to modification by A from time to time.
California is the leading, but by no means only, exponent of this practice. Under
it, the A court continues to exercise even an exclusive jurisdiction for possible modification. Both parties likewise continue to have the privilege of applying to the A
court for modification which if granted is Immediately given effect in the B court's
judgment record.
If this practice is valid as between the courts of two different states, it is at
least as valid between courts within a single state. Instead of curtailing Y's jurisdiction in any way, all of this enlarges and increases the agencies available for the
more effective enforcement of Y'8 judgment In the light of a realistic factual appraisal of the situation commonly arising.
This is a summary of the analysis I would make in any case. Fortunately,
however, California decisions, particularly, completely support these conclusions as
do Montana decisions as far as they go. In an almost identical type of case at the
domestic level a recent leading California Supreme Court case ruled that a local
judgment or decree might be sued on in another local court whenever "the plaintiff
will secure some advantage thereby." In an action in debt, based on an equity
decree given in another county, TV sued In Los Angeles County to recover a judgment for accrued alimony awarded in Butte County, and for a second decree on
which she could effectively and summarily secure further enforcement, subject to
possible modifications in Butte County. She received all the relief asked for.
Thomas v. Thomas, 14 Cal. 2d 355, 94 P.2d 810 (19319). This seems to state clearly
the general common law rule, at least as to suing in debt on a prior judgment. See
2 FPMN[AN, JUDM E~NTs2212, 2215 (5th ed. Tuttle 1925) ; and 50 C.J.S. Judgments
§ 849 (1947). This rule was first established in California by Ames v. Hoy, 12 Cal.
11 (1859), In an action in debt, based on an equity decree given in another county.
And in Lindsay Great Falls Co. v. McKinney Motor Co., 79 Mont. 136, 143, 255 Pac.
25. 2S (1927), our own supreme court declared in a case involving domestic courts
that "at common law a judgment has always been regarded as a cause of action
on which a right to bring suit exists, . . . the remedy by execution is cumulative
merely and statutes giving this remedy do not Impair the common law right of
action upon the judgment as of date of record," quoting California cases approvingly.
If such practice be permissible, as between IV and H, both of whom still are
within the awarding state, how much more desirable is it where one of the parties
is in a foreign state seeking collection. We have already stated some of the real,
practical advantages in allowing suit where the defendant can be found working at
the time of the suit. In our case these are advantages which-the state Itself Is quite
as interested in seeing realized as is the plaintiff because of its active Interest in the
litigation, expressed in the general policy of the Reciprocal Enforcement Act.
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Much more could be said in further support of our position, but I hope that this
is enough to tie it down.
Much of what we have said has particular application to your accepting jurisdiction for the purpose of litigating the issue of the defendant's liability as to past
due alimony. Aside from the Reciprocal Enforcement Act it might be argued possibly that whatever may be your duty in this respect you have no obligation at all to
assume a continuing jurisdiction to assure performance in the future. If the divorce-alimony decree were from a foreign state, such contention would be very arguable. However, whatever the general rule on this point may be, it appears that
the Reciprocal Enforcement Act imposes an affirmative duty to accept continuing
jurisdiction.
Again if the plaintiff were relying on a foreign decree for her alimony, the
Montana court would be free to determine for itself how much the defendant should
pay in the future. Since the decree here involved is by a sister court, however, it
would seem that you should continue measuring the defendant's liability strictly
according to the terms of that decree, permitting the defendant to raise in the Y
court the issue of whether the amount due should be changed.
The really difficult question in this case would arise if the Washington court
aipplied to the Y court and it insisted that you had exclusive jurisdiction as the
defendant's residence. A plausible argument can be made for the view that either
court may be called upon by the Washington court, though to me the wording of the
Act points to the residence court. However, without resolving that issue here it
seems that it would be administratively desirable generally for the residence court
to be asked to respond rather than the divorcing court.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/12

20

